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Abstract
This paper investigates how natural-resource endowments affect the provision of
local public goods in China. According to fiscal sociology, due to the rentier effect,
resource-rich local governments tend to have more state autonomy and are less
responsive to society, resulting in poor governance. Moreover, due to political
myopia, resource-abundant local governments tend to neglect the accumulation of
human capital. Shanxi’s county-level governments are excellent samples to test these
hypotheses. Statistical results show that resource-abundant local governments tend
to spend less on social expenditures as well as specific education, social security and
healthcare, and environmental protection expenditures. Meanwhile, coal-rich
governments spend significantly more on self-serving administrative expenditures.
The results suggest that negative impacts of natural resources on governmental fiscal
extraction and expenditure behaviors are an important causal mechanism of the
resource-curse hypothesis. To curb this problem, the current fiscal system needs to
be reformed accordingly.
Keywords: Resource curse, Coal, Public goods provision, Shanxi Province
Introduction
Why are developing countries and regions rich in natural resources often characterized
by slow economic growth? Exploring this “resource curse,” economists, political scien-
tists, and sociologists have put forward various causal mechanisms and explanations.
Economists first proposed a series of explanations, asserting that abundant resources
have a negative impact on domestic economic structure. These earlier studies often re-
gard governmental behavior as a constant, which underestimates the role of govern-
ment in economic development. Political scientists and sociologists then studied the
resource curse from the aspects of political science and fiscal sociology. With the com-
bined contributions of economics, political science, and fiscal sociology, scholars to
date widely agree that political and fiscal-related factors such as institutions, fiscal cap-
acity, and infrastructural capacity play important roles in explaining the resource-curse
hypothesis. From the political aspect, resource rent has a negative effect on the time
horizons of policy makers and government behaviors. From the perspective of fiscal
sociology, various types of government-revenue composition greatly influence the
state-society relationship, thus leading to various levels of governmental performance.
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Since fiscal revenue extraction and expenditure allocation play important roles in
governance, a relatively new approach to studying the causal mechanisms of the re-
source curse has been investigating the effect of rich resource rent on government fis-
cal extraction and spending behaviors. This paper follows this approach and examines
the effect of natural resources on public expenditure allocation in China’s context.
Scholars have produced a large number of studies on China’s resource curse over the
past two decades. However, some drawbacks still exist. First, most existing studies are
produced by economists, while research from political scientists and sociologists is rare,
unlike their counterparts in the English-speaking world. Second, methodologically, pre-
vious cross-sectional studies often control little if any political and institutional factors.
Third, many existing studies mix together different kinds of resources like coal, petrol-
eum, gas, and even other hard-rock minerals, which makes it difficult to clearly separ-
ate their individual contribution to the resource-curse hypothesis.
Addressing these unsolved problems, this paper employs a county-level dataset from
Shanxi Province to explore the effect of coal resources on government expenditure al-
location. Counties in Shanxi Province are quite similar in terms of institutions, policy
implementation, culture, language, and natural conditions, which maximally alleviates
potentially disturbing factors. Coal is widely distributed in Shanxi and contributes sig-
nificantly to the local economy, while its distribution varies substantially among the dif-
ferent counties. The statistical yearbook of Shanxi Province provides the volumes of
coal sales of all counties from 1994 to 2008. By calculating the ratio of coal sales to re-
gional GDP, we can obtain a key independent variable measuring coal resource abun-
dance. As for the dependent variables, the Fiscal Statistics of Prefectures, Cities and
Counties 2007 provides the ratios of social and administrative expenditures to overall
public expenditures. By combining these data, this study presents a series of statistical
models to explore how natural resources affect the provision of local public goods. As
the hypotheses of fiscal sociology and political science expect, this work finds that coal-
rich local governments tend to spend less on social expenditures, as well as on the spe-
cific expenditures of education, environmental protection, and social security and
healthcare. Meanwhile, coal-rich governments spend significantly more on administra-
tive expenditures. The results suggest that the negative impact of natural resources on
fiscal extraction and expenditure behaviors of government are an important causal
mechanism of the resource-curse hypothesis. To curb this problem, the current fiscal
system must be reformed accordingly.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, I briefly re-
view the existing literature on the resource-curse hypothesis. The subsequent section
explains the reasons for and advantages of choosing Shanxi counties as samples. In the
fourth section, hypotheses are generated, and statistical models are specified. The fifth
section presents the results and analyzes them. The last section concludes the study.
Literature review
In the 1950s, some scholars noted that economic stagnation often occurs in resource-
abundant developing economies (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950). A study of 30 states in
sub-Saharan Africa finds a negative correlation between the share of mineral resources
in total exports and economic performance (Wheeler 1984). Between 1971 and 1983
during the oil booms, the economic performances of large oil and mineral exporters
Zhuang and Zhang The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2016) 3:20 Page 2 of 22
were worse than their resource-poor counterparts (Gelb 1988). To date, most scholars
agree that abundant resources are a curse rather than a blessing for developing econ-
omies (Auty 1993; Gelb 1988). However, a few scholars disagree with this argument
and believe that there is no resource curse (Davis 1995). To test this hypothesis,
numerous large-sample statistical analyses and comparative case studies have been
conducted. Most of these studies confirm the resource-curse hypothesis at the cross-
national and cross-subnational level (Sachs et al. 1995; Johnson 2006). However,
scholars rarely agree on what factors cause this problem and how.
Economists were the first to notice this phenomenon and they generated various eco-
nomic explanations, most from the structural perspective. Among them, three argu-
ments are notable. First, some economists argue that minimally processed natural-
resource exporters suffer from a decline in the terms of trade in the long run, which
will continuously widen the price gap between manufactured goods and the primary
commodity (Prebisch 1950; Singer, 1950). Second, a branch of scholars note that inter-
national commodities are subject to large price fluctuations. This leaves resource-
exporting industries vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the global market, where it can be
transferred to the domestic economy, resulting in an unstable macroeconomic environ-
ment (Nurkse 1958). Third, some economists point out that the dominance of foreign
multinationals in resource extraction and export contributes little to the local economy.
Before the 1970s many resource industries in developing countries were controlled by
large foreign companies, casting doubt on whether foreign multinationals would stimu-
late local growth if they were allowed to repatriate their profits. These three explana-
tions generally fail to pass empirical tests. During the 1970s when two oil booms
occurred, oil-rich economies in the Middle East did not perform any better than their
resource-poor counterparts in East Asia even though oil prices surged and oil-export
nations controlled most of the oil industry.
The “Dutch Disease” was a fourth explanation proposed by economists. It is named
after the fact that the economy of the Netherlands stagnated after rich natural gas was
found in the 1960s. Two effects are thought to cause this problem. First, a sharp in-
crease in natural-resource exports lead to the appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Second, if the resource sector booms quickly, it draws capital and labor away from the
agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Ross 1999). The combination of these two rea-
sons results in a decline in the export of agricultural and manufactured goods, but a
cost rise in non-importable goods and services. The Dutch Disease was a promising
theoretical framework at first, but a closer look at this explanation finds it poorly fits
the cases of developing countries. It assumes that the capital and labor in a developing
economy are fixed and fully employed, yet developing countries often have labor sur-
pluses and their resource windfall could easily attract foreign capital and labor to offset
local scarcities (Benjamin et al. 1989; Gelb 1988). Davis (1995) even argues that if a
crowding-out effect does exist, it is a comparative advantage rather than a disadvantage
to the country.
These four previous economic explanations explore the resource curse from a similar
viewpoint by investigating how resource exports influence the domestic economic
structure. They all assume the role of government as a constant, that is, governments
have neither willingness nor capacity to mitigate those adverse effects brought by nat-
ural resources. This assumption runs counter to the reality that most resource-rich
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governments actually have a large say in their resource sector and have the policy tools
to intervene. For instance, governments can use their natural windfalls to invest in and
promote manufacturing and agricultural sectors, they can increase foreign currency re-
serves to prevent their real exchange rates from appreciating, and they could set up
stabilization funds and use careful fiscal policies to buffer against the vicissitudes of
international commodity markets (Ross 1999).
Reflecting on these earlier economic explanations, scholars came to realize that
explaining the resource curse must include addressing the question of why govern-
ments fail to take corrective measures. Theoretical frameworks proposed by political
scientists and fiscal sociologists gradually came into being. These later explanations be-
lieve that resource windfalls have a detrimental impact on government behaviors such
as the time horizons of policy makers, institutional development, methods of
government-revenue extraction, and the composition of government expenditures
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 2005; Mehlum et al. 2006; Moore 2001, 2004; Torvik 2009).
These explanations can generally be categorized into two approaches: the cognitive ex-
planation and the state-centralism explanation, which focus on the shortsightedness of
political leaders and the state-society relation in revenue extraction and public spend-
ing, respectively (Ross 1999).
The cognitive explanation. This approach suggests that resource wealth will shorten
the time horizons of policy makers and private actors, which is detrimental to the long-
term interests of resource-rich areas. More specifically, three effects may occur
(Robinson et al., 2006). First, human capital accumulation may be neglected. A boom-
ing resource sector not only attracts labor and capital from other industrial sectors but
also induces a myopic sloth among policy makers and private actors. Many manufac-
turing industries are characterized by “learning by doing”, which requires persistent in-
vestments in technology innovations and human capital. However, resource wealth
produces a get-rich-quick mentality among businessmen and policy makers, leading
them to underprovide those investments beneficial to manufacturing industries in the
long run.
The second effect is social rigidity. Resource-related industries may utilize their abun-
dant income to enlarge their political influence. They may try to capture some regula-
tors in the government and lobby legislators in the parliament to seek rent and
influence industrial policies in their favor. By doing so, they protect their own interests
at the expense of the whole society, and thus hindering the overall economic growth
(Olson 1982; Shafer 1994; Stigler 1971).
Third, resource wealth may increase the risk of military conflicts. The large and rich
resource rents make rebellions and coups financially feasible and one-time gain even
more attractive. Thus, rulers or insurgents would heavily discount the future, and the
risk of military conflicts would substantially increase (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 2005).
The state-centralism explanation. Fiscal sociology suggests that various types of
government-revenue composition would greatly affect state-society relations. Based on
whether states derive revenue mainly from state-owned properties, resource rents, or
taxation, states can be classified into domain states, rentier states, tax states, or fiscal
states. Among these states, the rentier state derives the dominant share of its revenue
from resource rent. Fiscal sociology argues that resource rent dependence would have a
detrimental influence on state building and institutional development for several
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reasons (Moore 2001, 2004). First, since the rentier state extracts revenue mainly from
resource industries, it has less incentive to satisfy citizens’ demands and provide public
goods. The rentier state’s overdependence on resources and a reduced dependence on
taxation undermine its state-society connection and increase its state autonomy from
the taxpayers. Since the rentier state is not heavily reliant on taxation, it would not be
subject to full parliamentary scrutiny. In addition, since it can easily extract large and
rich revenue rents from a relatively small number of resource enterprises, the rentier
state has less incentive to develop a sophisticated bureaucratic institution and tax ap-
paratus to fully penetrate the society (Moore 2004; Skocpol 1985). Second, the rentier
state can use its rich rents to buy off citizens by providing them with benefits without a
high level of taxation, making social mobilization and protest against the resource
economy and government policy less likely to occur (Paler 2013). Third, also thanks to
its rich resource rents, the rentier state can establish a powerful armed force to main-
tain internal security and keep the public demobilized (Ross 2001).
To date, research on the resource curse in the English-speaking world has gradually
turned to an emphasis on the political, institutional, and fiscal factors. Nevertheless, re-
search in China’s context lags behind since most studies are still carried out primarily
from the economic perspective. For example, by utilizing cross-provincial data, some
studies find that the resource curse does exist in China (Hu and Xiao 2007; Shao and
Qi 2009; Xu and Wang 2006; Zhang et al. 2008). In contrast, other studies based on
cross-prefectural data find that the correlation between resource abundance and eco-
nomic performance is not clear (Ding et al. 2007; Fang et al. 2011). These studies all
adopt an economic perspective and underestimate political and institutional factors
since they merely control certain political variables such as corruption (Shao and Qi
2009), government efficiency (Fang et al. 2011), and governmental intervention
(Ding et al. 2007) in their statistical models.
Zhan’s and Hong’s articles constitute exceptions in the existing literature focusing on
China’s resource curse. Their studies are conducted from the viewpoint of political sci-
ence and fiscal sociology. By comparing two neighboring counties in Guizhou Province
and employing cross-prefectural and cross-provincial panel datasets, Zhan and Hong
find that resource abundance breeds corruption, decreases government spending on
human capital accumulation, and increases the likelihood of social instability (Hong
2013; Zhan 2013, 2015; Zhan et al. 2015). However, these studies still have some draw-
backs in their methodology, as does the previous research by economists. First, there
are still many unmeasurable or uncontrollable factors in their models, such as institu-
tional, cultural, social, and geographical factors, which may reduce the efficiency of the
models. Second, varying kinds of resources like coal, petroleum, gas, and other hard-
rock minerals are often mixed together to denote a simple independent variable, mak-
ing it hard to clearly separate their individual contribution to the resource curse.
Dealing with these problems and applying a theoretical framework based on political
science and fiscal sociology, this paper employs a dataset of county-level governments
in Shanxi Province to study how resource endowments influence the provision of local
public goods. Before moving to the sections on hypothesis generation and model speci-
fication, it is necessary to briefly state the reasons for and the advantages of choosing
Shanxi’s county-level governments as samples.
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County-level governments in Shanxi as excellent samples
Although petroleum and natural gas consumption has increased steadily in recent
years, coal still remains the top energy source in China. Taking the year 2007 as an ex-
ample, coal made up 70 % of all domestic energy consumption. Among the major prov-
inces producing fossil fuel, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Guizhou produce coal
exclusively. Utilizing these provinces as cases can avoid the problem of mixing different
kinds of resources together (see Table 1).
In addition, Shanxi has further merits. First, Shanxi Province has a long history and a
large amount of coal production where coal is widely distributed among various coun-
ties. The coal in Shanxi is of high quality and makes a huge contribution to the local
economy. For example, in 2012, the coal production of Shanxi was 0.913 billion tons,
and the sales income was 1187 billion yuan, which nominally accounted for 98 % of the
provincial GDP. It has been calculated that since 2000, the real annual contribution
rates of the coal industry to Shanxi’s economy have always been above 40 %, and in
2012, it was 56.6 % (Lu 2010; Liu 2013). Coal is distributed widely in Shanxi. In 2007,
among 96 counties and county-level cities, 69 produced coal. Other hard-rock resource
production such as iron and bauxite accounted for less than 1 % of that of coal in terms
of sales. We thus do not consider other hard-rock minerals due to their small contribu-
tions. The land income of local governments also has some rentier features. Since
counties and county-level cities in Shanxi are similar in their geographical locations, we
can easily control the effect of land income by adding regional GDP per capita to the
statistical models.
Second, in many counties, coal-related industries are the pillars of the local economy,
and thus, these governments’ revenues are highly dependent on coal-related rents.
Among the top ten counties in terms of regional GDP, the coal sales volume of Xiaoyi,
Table 1 Fossil fuel energy production by region in 2007
Region Coal Crude oil Natural gas Region Coal Crude oil Natural gas
10,000 t 10,000 t 100 million m3 10,000 t 10,000 t 100 million m3
Shanxi 63020.93 Ningxia 3771.84
Inner Mongolia 35437.94 Jilin 3354.18 623.93 5.22
Shaanxi 20353.51 2265.87 110.10 Jiangxi 2997.24
Henan 19287.15 485.08 15.76 Jiangsu 2480.20 195.72 0.58
Shandong 14518.34 2793.05 7.84 Fujian 2050.00
Guizhou 10864.18 Hubei 1084.26 85.54 1.17
Heilongjiang 10065.11 4169.83 25.50 Qinghai 963.64 220.66 34.02
Sichuan 9557.74 18.14 187.46 Guangxi 721.48 2.88
Anhui 9265.65 Beijing 648.80
Hebei 8662.98 660.01 7.14 Zhejiang 12.33
Yunnan 7755.19 0.14 Tianjin 1924.28 13.34
Liaoning 6349.09 1207.17 8.72 Guangdong 1261.13 52.48
Hunan 6217.16 Hainan 10.66 2.03
Xinjiang 4915.52 2604.31 210.2 Shanghai 20.69 5.07
Chongqing 4293.63 5.00 Tibet
Gansu 3949.34 82.88 0.63
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2008b
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Zezhou, Gaoping, Xiangyuan, and Yangcheng in 2007 was over 10 million tons and that
of Hongdong and Jiexiu was more than 4 million tons (Shanxi Statistical Bureau 2008).
Hejin, a county-level city ranking first in terms of regional GDP despite its low coal
sales volume, was also highly dependent on coal-related industries: the profits of non-
ferrous metal, coking, and ferrous metal industries accounted for 91 % of all profits of
local industrial enterprises above the designated size (Dong 2007). This high coal de-
pendence makes the local economy vulnerable to fluctuations in coal prices and sales
volume. For instance, in 2006, the economies of Gujiao and Zuoyun experienced severe
recession. Their GDP annual growth rate in nominal terms was −17 and −13 %, re-
spectively, because serious mining accidents and safety problems occurred in that year,
leading to a more than 40 % decline in coal production (Dong 2007).
Similar to local economies’ dependence, government revenues of resource-rich re-
gions are also highly dependent on coal-related taxes and fees. According to the institu-
tional arrangements of China’s fiscal system, coal-related taxes are primarily collected
or shared by local authorities. In addition, various non-statutory fees are charged.
According to the stipulations of the Shanxi Provincial Government, four types of coal-
related fees are charged: (1) 15 items approved by the central government, (2) govern-
ment funds for education, forest restoration, and other purposes that were approved by
the provincial government, (3) service fees for transportation, inspections, and so on,
and (4) other miscellaneous fees charged by local governments and trade associations
(Shanxi Provincial Government 2014). Most fees of the fourth type are charged without
higher-up governments’ approval, leaving local governments with significant arbitrary
power to collect rents. It is estimated that besides 21 tax items, more than 88 approved
and unapproved fees are collected, which together can make up 25–35 % of the coal
price (Tian 2014; Zhao 2014).
Third, counties in Shanxi have few differences in ethnic, cultural, and geographic fac-
tors, making them better samples than those in Inner Mongolia or Guizhou Province.
In the latter two provinces, counties vary significantly in language, culture, and ethnic
composition. More specifically, Inner Mongolia has a large territory within which eth-
nic minorities comprise varying proportions among different areas and enjoy varying
preferential policies. Guizhou also has a large proportion of ethnic minorities, and its
annual coal production takes up less than one sixth of that in Shanxi. Comparatively
speaking, county-level governments in Shanxi thus provide better samples.
Lastly, detailed data of the key explanatory variable are available from Shanxi
Statistical Yearbooks. The books contain the sales volume of local coal enterprises
(including SOEs at the under-provincial level, collective enterprises, and private enter-
prises) between 1994 and 2008. In 2007 and 2008, the years before many local coal en-
terprises were forcibly taken over by provincial- or central-level SOEs, local enterprises
produced 335.87 million and 336.93 million tons of coal, respectively, accounting for
more than 50 % of total production by all enterprises in each year (Shanxi Statistical
Bureau 2008, 2009).1 Even though this number cannot cover all coal production of en-
terprises of various ownerships within counties, we argue that using it would not pro-
duce systematic bias for the following reasons. First, provincial- and central-level coal
SOEs’ major mines were often located in coalfields that were also exploited by local-
level enterprises (see Table 2). Provincial- and central-level SOEs usually own large
mines of good quality and large quantity and leave adjacent coalfields with poorer
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quality and lower quantity to the local enterprises. Due to their geographical overlap-
ping, competition between enterprises of various ownership were often fierce, and dis-
putes sometimes broke out when local-level enterprises encroached on the mining area
of central- and provincial-level SOEs. Concerned about losing their market shares, the
latter often criticized local-level enterprises, especially those that were privately owned,
and reported them to the regulation authorities on the grounds that the local enter-
prises often disobeyed work-safety rules (Wright 2012). Second, according to China’s
fiscal rules, central- and provincial-level SOEs have to directly hand over their assigned
taxes and fees to the higher-up governments, which alleviates their possible detrimental
influences on local governments’ behaviors.
For these reasons, we can use the volume of coal sales to calculate to what extent the
economy of a specific county relies on coal production by multiplying the volumes with
the annual average price of coal and then obtain its share in local GDP. This calculating
method of what we call the Coal Dependence Index (CDI) has been widely used in pre-
vious research as an indicator of resource dependence (Davis 1995).
Hypotheses, data, and method
Hypotheses
It is widely accepted that taxation in modern states should be based on bilateral agree-
ments in which governments deliver public services in exchange for citizens’ agreement
to levies. Since taxation is often the key to a country’s state capacity and policy imple-
mentation, governments often want to exploit it as much as possible. However, taxation
Table 2 Coal sales volume of local mine in 2007 (10,000 t)
Region Sale Region Sale Region Sale Region Sale
Xiaoyi* 1879.23 Heshun* 467.82 Huozhou* 204.71 Pinglu 31.33
Liulin* 1588.65 Hequ 456.43 Yicheng 203.35 Fenyang 29.33
Baode* 1365.60 Puxian* 429.94 Jiaokou 202.29 Hunyuan 27.79
Gaoping* 1256.87 Jiexiu* 427.60 Lingchuan 155.36 Fushan 25.32
Yuxian* 1255.82 Hongtong 426.02 Tunliu* 142.22 Pianguan 19.50
Yangcheng 1216.92 Qinyuan* 425.56 Pingyao 140.60 Datongxian 16.29
Shanyin 1208.00 Xiyang* 413.03 Jiaocheng* 127.69 Loufan 13.31
Zezhou* 1063.06 Anze 381.06 Jixian 104.15 Shilou 11.21
Xiangyuan* 1001.57 Xingxian 372.25 Yuanping* 102.30 Xixian 9.08
Changzhi* 962.97 Fangshan 369.98 Taigu 100.80 Guangling 5.61
Xiangning* 910.66 Gujiao* 361.50 Jingle 89.38 Wutai* 2.15
Shouyang* 909.24 Linxian* 353.34 Hejin 82.13 Shenchi 1.99
Lingshi* 750.80 Zhangzi* 348.20 Huguan 80.12 Licheng 0.17
Zuoyun* 716.15 Pingding* 341.34 Lanxian 68.37 Yangqu 0.10
Ningwu* 560.82 Youyu 327.90 Fenxi 49.60 Xiangfen 0.02
Qinshui* 534.31 Zhongyang 311.72 Lucheng 46.02
Wuxiang 494.87 Zuoquan 308.27 Wenshui 34.31
Guxian 485.28 Huairen* 252.49 Daning 33.68
Note: (1) Regions marked with * are county-level areas in which some large mines owned by central- and provincial-level
state-owned coal enterprises were located
(2) Data sources: Shanxi Statistical Bureau, 2008; Chang et al. 2007; State Administration of Work Safety and Coal Mine
Safety, 2014
Zhuang and Zhang The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2016) 3:20 Page 8 of 22
also has a distortion effect in that if governments levy on citizens excessively, it will
hinder economic efficiency; in theory, citizens may vote with their feet by choosing to
move away. For this reason, no government can levy significantly more taxes than its
neighboring governments because it could lead to the outflow of labor and capital
(Besley and Case 1995; Tiebout 1956).
In reality, according to China’s current Tax Sharing System (TSS) in effect from 1994,
under-provincial local governments have little if any arbitrary power to adjust tax rates.
The adoption of TSS was designed with the purpose of increasing the central govern-
ment’s share of revenue, which has been successfully achieved. Facing the shortage of
fiscal revenue caused by the TSS reform, many provinces similarly introduced intrapro-
vincial fiscal system reforms and concentrated more revenue on the provincial and pre-
fectural levels, leaving county-level and township-level governments with severe fiscal
revenue shortages. As a consequence, numerous county- and township-level govern-
ments cannot cover public expenditures with their own fiscal revenue and thus have to
rely on intergovernmental transfer to fill the gaps. This vertical fiscal imbalance has
pushed local governments to develop new ways to make money, such as land finance.
Things are different for Shanxi’s coal-rich local governments. They can easily extract
rich rents from coal-related activities through tax and fee collection. Therefore, the de-
gree of fiscal autonomy of coal-rich local governments is expected to be higher than
their coal-poor counterparts. In addition, as mentioned above, miscellaneous coal-
related fees and charges are collected. Since they are listed as nontax revenues in the
government budget, it can be expected that coal-rich local governments tend to have
higher ratios of nontax revenues to total revenues. Utilizing detailed data from Fiscal
Statistics of Prefectures, Cities and Counties 2007, we measured the degree of fiscal
autonomy of local governments by calculating the proportion of their total budgetary
revenue to total budgetary spending and measured the nontax revenue ratios by calcu-
lating the proportion of nontax revenue to total budgetary revenue. We then drew two
scatterplots, using these two variables as dependent variables, and the Coal Dependence
Index as the independent variable. These figures demonstrate that the degree of fiscal
autonomy and nontax revenue ratios are positively correlated with the Coal Dependence
Index, and these correlations still hold if we further include control variables of GDP per
capita, population, land-area size, and urbanization ratio (not shown). These results illus-
trate that coal-related taxes and fees serve as rents for Shanxi’s coal-rich local govern-
ments. We can thus accordingly propose hypotheses based on the explanations of
political shortsightedness and state centralism (Fig. 1a, b).
Chinese governments exercise various state functions that can be categorized into ad-
ministrative, law and order, economic development, and social development functions
(Zhang 2012). The term “administrative function” refers to daily government mainten-
ance and operation activities that support other government functions. The law and
order function works to protect citizens from foreign attack and domestic disorder.
The economic development function promotes economic development and stabilizes
the macroeconomy. The social development function, which emerged most recently,
serves to promote citizens’ welfare, well-being, and humanitarian development, which
includes government services in education, science and technology, cultural develop-
ment, healthcare, social security, and environmental protection. Whether this function
works well is the key to citizens’ livelihood and whether citizens enjoy full social rights
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and decent lives (Esping-Andersen 1990; Marshall 1950). The term “public goods
provision” used in this paper mainly focuses on this function. Existing studies typically
use three methods to measure the performance of public goods provision (Jia and Lu
2010). The first method is to investigate how much money a government allocates to a
certain item, which reveals whether this issue is high on the list of policy priorities.
Second, scholars use intermediate output indicators to measure the level of public
goods provision. For example, we can use student-teacher ratio and medical beds per
capita to measure the levels of education and medical service, respectively. The third
method is to examine performance improvement after receiving public services. For in-
stance, we can use the illiteracy rate and average life expectancy to measure the levels
of education and medical service, respectively. Each method has its merits; the first
method is the most direct one since governments’ fiscal capacities are often limited,
and the relative shares that a government spends on certain items can reflect their rela-
tive position on the list of policy priorities. We thus adopted the first method. Accord-
ing to the new classification of revenue and expenditures adopted by China’s fiscal
Fig. 1 a Coal Dependence Index and degree of fiscal autonomy. b Coal Dependence Index and nontax
revenue ratio
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authority since 2007, we combined public expenditures on education; science and tech-
nology; culture, sports, and media development; social security and employment;
healthcare; and environmental protection as social expenditures (Ministry of
Finance 2006).
How does abundant coal influence social expenditures? According to Wagner’s Law,
as personal income grows, government functions will also extend, and public expendi-
tures on education, culture, healthcare, and social welfare will accordingly increase
(Wagner 1958). However, according to the state-centralism explanation of fiscal soci-
ology, since the economic development of Shanxi’s coal-rich counties and their fiscal
revenues rely heavily on coal-related rents, the governments will have higher state au-
tonomy and will be less accountable to the public. These governments will thus spend
less on social affairs. If this is the case, we could see that the shares of social expendi-
tures are negatively correlated with the Coal Dependence Index.
In addition to the state-centralism explanation, the cognitive explanation argues that
rent dependence will generate political shortsightedness among policy makers in spe-
cific policy areas. Education is fundamental to human capital accumulation in the long
term, and spending on education usually accounts for the largest share of a county’s
total expenditures. In coal-rich areas, satisfied by the decent coal-related income, many
people become “locked” into low-skill intensive coal-based industries and thus have a
lower willingness to pursue schooling. Likewise, local governments, satisfied by rich
coal rents, may devote inadequate attention to human capital development (Gylfason
2001). We therefore expect that governments with more coal resource will spend less
on education. Social security and healthcare are also beneficial to human capital devel-
opment since the social safety net could protect individuals from falling into extreme
poverty, but because of the political myopia brought by rich coal rents, coal-rich gov-
ernments may underprovide these public services. We thus expect that governments
with more coal resources will spend less on social security and healthcare.
Coal production is often linked to deforestation and pollution. According to China’s
Coal Law and Environmental Law, coal enterprises have an obligation to take measures
such as reforestation and sewage treatment to address these issues. Since environmen-
tal protection is a kind of public good, coal-rich governments should not only closely
monitor the coal mines but also devote some money to addressing environmental prob-
lems. If this is the case, it should be found that governments with more coal resources
will spend more on environmental protection. However, the coal-rent dependence of
governments and the rampant rent-seeking activities within coal-related industries may
result in an inverse relationship between coal abundance and environmental protection
spending since coal-rich governments may intentionally implement environmental laws
laxly. Statistical results will show which hypothesis is the real case. We thus propose
the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: The higher the Coal Dependence Index, the lower the share of social
expenditures in total government expenditures.
Hypothesis 1a: The higher the Coal Dependence Index, the lower the share of education
expenditures in total government expenditures.
Hypothesis 1b: The higher the Coal Dependence Index, the lower the share of social
security and healthcare expenditures in total government expenditures.
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Hypothesis 1c: The higher the Coal Dependence Index, the higher (or lower) the share of
environmental protection expenditures in total government expenditures.
After proposing these hypotheses on social expenditures, we turn to analyzing how
coal rents affect administrative expenditures. Public choice theory argues that rational
government bureaucrats will always seek to increase their budgets in order to increase
their own power (Krueger 1974; Niskanen 1971; Tullock 1965). With the economic de-
velopment and administrative reform after 1978, China’s government institutions have
become “fragmented” and rationalized, which provide room for bureaucrats to pursue
their own interests (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). Coal mining and production are
policy fields in which many regulators such as administrators in work safety, industry
and commerce, tax, and environmental protection are involved. In coal-rich areas, this
extensive involvement provides those regulators with many opportunities to seek rents.
Coal enterprises, willing to reduce costs by adopting lower safety and environmental
protection criteria, also seek rents from government officials. As a consequence, collu-
sions between self-interested government officials and coal enterprises should be easily
found in coal-rich areas. The possible methods of collusion include corruption during
the licensing process, lax regulation implementation, and even shared ownership of
coal enterprises by government officials, all of which may lead to more coal safety acci-
dents and extensive corruption in governments (Nie et al. 2013; Wright 2012). One
way to examine whether this is the case is to investigate whether the administrative ex-
penditures in coal-rich local governments are higher than their coal-poor counterpart
areas. In China’s current classification of revenue and expenditures, administrative ex-
penditures are listed as an item of “general public service.” According to the explana-
tory notes given by Ministry of Finance, it includes the basic operation expenditures of
administrative departments such as the local party committee, the government general
office, the bureau of finance and tax, industry and commerce, and work safety. Besides
the proposition of more collusion, the state-centralism explanation of fiscal sociology
argues that since rich fiscal revenues are extracted from coal mines rather than from
ordinary taxpayers, coal-rich governments have fewer incentives to satisfy public de-
mands and have more arbitrary power on budgetary decisions relative to legislation.
This higher degree of state autonomy helps government officials serve their own inter-
ests by spending more on administrative expenditures. We thus propose:
Hypothesis 2: The higher the Coal Dependence Index, the higher the share of
administrative expenditures in total expenditures.
Data and method
Detailed data on local coal sales volumes are available from the Shanxi Statistical
Yearbooks before 2008. Since 2009, many local coal enterprises were forcibly taken over
by provincial- or central-level SOEs and the data is no longer available. Since fiscal
items adopted by the fiscal authorities from 2007 on are not comparable to those from
earlier, and the Fiscal Statistics of Prefectures, Cities and Counties can only provide de-
tailed data for 2007 (not available in 2008 and 2009), this study employs a cross-
sectional dataset comprised of 96 counties and county-level cities in 2007. We
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calculated the Coal Dependence Index by multiplying the local sales volumes with an-
nual average coal prices and then divided them by the local GDP (Davis 1995).2 The
shares of various public expenditures were measured by expenditures on various policy
fields divided by local total expenditures. As explained earlier, social expenditures in-
clude the fiscal items of education; science and technology; culture, sports, and media
development; social security and employment; healthcare; and environmental protec-
tion. Within the social expenditures category, education expenditures and environmen-
tal protection expenditures refer to the items of education and environmental
protection, respectively; social security and healthcare expenditures are the sum of the
items social security and employment and medical and healthcare. Administrative ex-
penditures come from the item “general public service” (Ministry of Finance 2006).
Figure 2a, b presents two scatterplots. They suggest that, in line with our expecta-
tions, the share of social expenditures is negatively correlated with the Coal Depend-
ence Index and the share of administrative expenditures is positively correlated with
CDI.
Fig. 2 a Coal Dependence Index and the share of social expenditures. b Coal Dependence Index and the
share of administrative expenditures
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To further test the aforementioned hypotheses, we present a branch of regression
models employing a cross-sectional dataset of Shanxi Province counties and county-
level cities in 2007. The basic regression model is:
lnY i ¼ αþ βlnCoali þ γlnControli þ Ddummy þ εi
where i is the county (or county-level city); Yi are our dependent variables, i.e., the
shares of various expenditures in total expenditures; α is the constant; Coali refers to
the Coal Dependence Index, the key independent variable in this paper; and β is its co-
efficient. Controli denotes a vector of control variables, and γ are their coefficients. The
term dummy denotes the administrative level of counties, and D is its coefficient. The
term ɛi is the random error.
Other than the key independent variable, we introduced a series of control variables
such as GDP per capita, the ratio of urban population, total population, land-area size,
and a dummy variable of county-level city (see Table 3). GDP per capita and the ratio
of urban population to total population are the proxies for economic development.
Total population and land-area size were used to control the scale effect. The dummy
variable of administrative level was coded as 1 if it is a county-level city and ordinary
counties were coded as 0. In addition, in specific models, some other variables were
further controlled, such as transfer dependency (the ratio of budgetary fiscal transfers
to total expenditures), the number of students in elementary and middle school per
10,000 persons, and the number of hospital beds per 10,000 persons (both are proxies
for the demands of local public services). Except for the dummy variable, all variables
were logged to alleviate heteroscedasticity. Potential endogeneity problems could arise
Table 3 Descriptive summary of variables (2007)
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Independent variables
Coal Dependence Index (%) 20.33 27.02 0 123.954
GDP per capita (yuan) 13061.03 8639.64 2357 49,566
Ratio of urbanization (%) 30.70 10.02 12.240 70.640
Total population (person) 257380.40 132707.30 62,201 740,341
Land area (km2) 1471.09 589.32 221 3166
County-level city (dummy variable) 0 1
Transfer dependency (%) 61.946 23.403 0 96.542
Number of students in primary and middle school (per 10,000
persons)
1732.632 280.900 1212.391 2766.479
Number of beds in healthcare institutions (per 10,000 persons) 24.909 10.249 6.363 56.789
Dependent variables
Share of social expenditures (%) 51.062 7.018 30.033 63.490
Share of education expenditures (%) 23.999 4.919 13.850 37.608
Share of social security and healthcare expenditures (%) 19.533 4.986 8.909 31.523
Share of environmental protection expenditures (%) 5.337 3.222 0.987 15.652
Share of administrative expenditures (%) 21.039 7.171 12.489 47.244
Notes: (1) N = 96. When calculating the shares of various expenditures in total expenditures, both budgetary and
extrabudgetary expenditures were included. The share of own revenues in expenditures in the Hejin county-level city of
Yuncheng is 117 %, and we take it as 100 %. Its transfer dependency (the ratio of transfers to total expenditures) is then
0 %. Therefore, we took the log of transfer dependency as log (x + 1). Similarly, when taking the log of the Coal Dependence
Index, we used the same method
(2) Data source: Ministry of Finance, 2011; National Bureau of Statistics, 2008a, c; Shanxi Statistical Bureau, 2008
Zhuang and Zhang The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2016) 3:20 Page 14 of 22
since government spending may have reverse impacts on economic development and
coal sales. To deal with this empirical challenge, we also ran two-stage least squares
(2SLS), using a 1-year lag of the Coal Dependence Index and 1-year and 2-year lags of
GDP per capita as instruments in the regression. These instrumental variables satisfy
two conditions: (1) they are not correlated with the error term in the model; (2) they
are partially correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables.
Results and discussion
Results
Tables 4 and 5 present empirical results obtained by using Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) and 2-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimates. In the over-identifying test, the
p values of Hansen J statistics are larger than the critical value of 0.05, indicating that the
instruments adopted are all exogenous and valid. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics for
weak identification test are far higher than 19.9, and their significant levels are under the
Table 4 Coal dependence and various government expenditures in Shanxi Province (2007)
Share of social expenditures Share of administrative expenditures
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS
Coal Dependence Index −0.027*** −0.032*** 0.078*** 0.081***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017)
GDP per capita 0.050 0.078** −0.004 −0.042
(0.038) (0.039) (0.078) (0.079)
Transfer dependency 0.136** 0.151** −0.091 −0.116
(0.062) (0.064) (0.116) (0.121)
Ratio of urbanization −0.029 −0.046 −0.131 −0.105
(0.062) (0.060) (0.105) (−0.099)
Total population 0.096*** 0.094*** −0.137*** −0.136***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.051) (−0.049)
Land area 0.043 0.057* −0.097 −0.113*
(0.031) (0.029) (0.066) (−0.065)
County-level city 0.088 0.099* −0.163 −0.180*
(0.061) (0.060) (0.112) (0.108)
Number of students 0.121 0.123
(0.107) (0.102)
Number of hospital beds −0.001 −0.003
(0.025) (0.032)
Constant 0.661 0.327 6.100*** 6.56***
(1.187) (1.142) (1.415) (1.467)
R square 0.3862 0.3803 0.3473 0.3448
Hansen J test p value 0.3225 0.6684
Cragg-Donald Wald F 262.06 253.65
Hausman specification P 0.0207 0.2171
Notes: (1) N = 96. Except for the administrative level dummy, all variables are in logarithms. Numbers in table are
unstandardized coefficients. White’s heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients
(2) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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critical value of 0.05. They indicate that the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak
can be rejected (Stock and Yogo 2005).
The results estimated by OLS and 2SLS are quite consistent. Considering which results
are preferred, we used the Durbin-Wu Hausman test. The p values of this test between
models 1 and 2, models 5 and 6, and models 7 and 8 are smaller than 0.05. We therefore
reject the null hypothesis and believe the estimators of 2SLS are better, thus models 2, 6,
and 8 are preferred. The p values of this test between models 3 and 4 and models 9 and
10 are larger than 0.05. We thus believe that there is no significant difference between the
OLS and 2SLS estimators and adopt the OLS estimators (models 3 and 9) since they are
more efficient (Hausman 1978). The R-squared of these models indicate that 30 to 48 %
of the variation in the dependent variables can be explained.
Model 2 shows that the coefficient of the Coal Dependence Index is negative and sta-
tistically significant at the 1 % level. This result conforms to the expectant hypothesis
of state-centralism explanations. Among other control variables, transfer dependency is
positive and statistically significant, which suggests that transfers from upper levels








(5) OLS (6) 2SLS (7) OLS (8) 2SLS (9) OLS (10) 2SLS
Coal Dependence Index −0.017 −0.025** −0.035** −0.034** −0.080** −0.083**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.037) (0.037)
GDP per capita 0.040 0.042 0.026 0.073 0.051 0.071
(0.042) (0.041) (0.081) (0.083) (0.142) (0.141)
Transfer decency 0.096* 0.089* 0.273** 0.307** −0.132 −0.122
(0.057) (0.050) (0.114) (0.125) (0.089) (0.086)
Ratio of urbanization −0.230*** −0.227*** −0.120 −0.088 0.312 0.300
(0.068) (0.064) (0.120) (0.119) (0.253) (0.244)
Total population 0.243*** 0.239*** 0.170*** 0.169*** −0.598*** −0.600***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.051) (0.050) (0.115) (0.112)
Land area 0.035 0.046 0.033 0.046 0.293** 0.305**
(0.046) (0.044) (0.059) (0.056) (0.140) (0.139)
County-level city 0.134* 0.130* 0.026 0.050 0.109 0.116
(0.079) (0.075) (0.098) (0.096) (0.253) (0.242)
Number of students 0.244** 0.240**
(0.120) (0.115)
Number of hospital beds 0.144** 0.139**
(0.064) (0.061)
Constant −1.872 −1.863 −1.534 −2.071 5.910** 5.671**
(1.192) (1.123) (1.504) (1.537) (2.290) (2.242)
R square 0.4801 0.4774 0.3692 0.3649 0.2989 0.2987
Hansen J test p value 0.5686 0.7686 0.0642
Cragg-Donald Wald F 257.339 256.269 253.652
Hausman specification P 0.0464 0.0364 0.8909
Note:(1) N = 96. Except for the administrative level dummy, all variables are in logarithms. Numbers in table are
unstandardized coefficients. White’s heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients
(2) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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could stimulate local governments to increase the share of social expenditures in total
expenditures. The coefficients of GDP per capita, population, and county-level city are
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that local governments with higher eco-
nomic development will spend more on social affairs. The coefficient of land area is
positively significant at the 10 % level, which implies that as the land-area size in-
creases, local governments will increase public spending on social affairs.
For administrative spending, model 3 shows that, as expected, coal dependence has a sig-
nificant positive effect on the share of administrative expenditures in total expenditures.
Among the 96 county-level governments, administrative expenditures averagely account for
21 % of total expenditures, a smaller percentage than that of social expenditures, which is
51 % (see Table 4). However, the coefficient of the Coal Dependence Index on the former is
0.078, while on the latter, it is −0.032. This shows that administrative expenditures are more
sensitive to the coal economy. For control variables, the coefficient of total population is
positive and statistically significant, which suggests that there is a scale economy in adminis-
trative spending. The negative coefficients of land area and county-level city dummy, al-
though not statistically significant at the 10 % level, also suggest the effect of scale economy.
We now turn to the specific expenditures in the social expenditures category. The re-
sults of models 6 and 8 in Table 5 indicate that, as expected, coal dependence has a
detrimental effect on both education expenditures and social security and healthcare
expenditures. Among other control variables, the coefficients of transfer dependency
are significant, suggesting that fiscal transfers can incentivize local governments to pro-
vide more public goods services. The coefficients of the number of students in primary
and middle school and the number of beds in hospital institutions are positive and sta-
tistically significant at the 10 % level, indicating that local governments with larger de-
mands of education and healthcare do spend more on these affairs.
As the law and regulation stipulate, coal-rich governments should devote more money to
address coal production-related environmental problems. The results of model 9 are exactly
the opposite: governments with more coal endowments spend significantly less on environ-
mental protection, conforming to the explanations of state autonomy and political short-
sightedness. On average, environmental expenditures account for 5.3 % of total
expenditures among all county-level governments in Shanxi. Compared to education expen-
ditures (24 %) and social security and healthcare expenditures (19.5 %), it is a relatively small
expenditure category (see Table 5). However, the coefficient of coal dependence on it stands
at −0.080, far larger than that on education spending (−0.025) and on social security and
healthcare (−0.043), which suggests that governmental decisions on environmental spending
are more sensitive to coal endowment. For other control variables, the coefficient of popula-
tion is significantly negative and that of land-area size is significantly positive. This implies
that there is also a scale economy in environmental protection since the efficiency of envir-
onmental spending would increase in an area with a larger population but smaller land-area
size. In addition, it is much easier for areas with a small land-area size to free ride the efforts
of their neighboring areas, while those with a large land area have to be more self-sufficient.
Discussion
Having provided some evidence in favor of the proposed hypotheses, we now further
analyze the transmission channels through which they take place. Local governments in
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Shanxi can easily extract rich revenues from the coal-related industries. Since these rich
resource rents can cover a larger share of their own expenditures, coal-rich local gov-
ernments are less dependent on tax extractions and have higher degrees of state auton-
omy. They are thus less accountable to their taxpayers and less willing to satisfy
citizens’ social demands. In addition, since local governments could easily extract rich
rents from a relatively small number of coal enterprises and from extrabudgetary fees
and charges, the budgets of coal-rich local governments are subject to little scrutiny
from local People’s Congresses. Extensive government regulation of the coal industries
creates red tape and generates room for rent-seeking activities and collusion among
regulators and regulated firms. More spending on administration can thus be found as
local government officials pursue their own individual interests.
Education is an important public service for accumulating human capital. Among
China’s local governments, education spending usually accounts for the largest portion
of county expenditures. The field study we conducted found that the relation between
coal endowment and education expenditures is tricky. For example, coal-rich counties
often have a better educational infrastructure, and a few counties can even offer free
high school education. How then can the negative impact of coal dependence in the
statistical model be explained, which runs counter to our field observations? Several
reasons may explain this. First, as is the tradition in the era of planned economy, some
state-owned coal enterprises may run primary and middle schools themselves for their
workers’ children. By doing so, they shoulder some of the public service burdens that
local governments normally provide. Since their education spending would not be listed
in the government budget, coal-rich county governments may have a lower share of
educational expenditures. Second, coal endowments tend to decrease local citizens’
willingness to pursue education. Similar to previous studies, we find people in coal-
abundant areas can easily earn a decent income through various ways related to the
coal production. For instance, they can provide food, transportation, security, and other
logistical services to coal enterprises, or work as miners or even as shareholders. Most
of these jobs do not require higher education degrees. Local habitants are thus locked
into low-skill intensive coal industries and local governments accordingly devote less
spending to education (Gylfason 2001; Zhan et al. 2015). Since coal-rich areas will
eventually run out of their coal resources, these governments should overcome this
political shortsightedness and transfer more coal rents into education spending to accu-
mulate human capital.
Expenditures on healthcare and social security are also a kind of human capital in-
vestment. They are especially beneficial to disadvantaged individuals since they play an
important role in promoting and maintaining people’s health conditions and ability to
work. Coal mining poses occupational hazards to coal miners since miners are exposed
to particulate matter (PM), dust, noise, chemicals, and elemental toxins in coal-mining
activities. Previous studies in the USA find that residents in close proximity to coal
mines are associated with poorer health status and higher risk for hypertension, cardio-
pulmonary disease, kidney disease, and chronic lung disease (Hendryx and Ahern 2008;
Hendryx et al. 2007). China’s Coal Law clearly states that governments and coal enter-
prises must take measures to protect workplace safety and labor health (Article 8).
However, the statistical results show that coal-rich county-level governments actually
spend less on healthcare and social security. There are several reasons for this. First, as
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the explanations of political shortsightedness and state centralism argue, coal-rich gov-
ernments tend to neglect the importance of human capital investment and are less re-
sponsive to citizens’ demands. Second, similar to the reasons for less education
expenditures, some large state-owned coal enterprises run their own hospitals, which
reduce the governments’ expenditures. Third, in field studies, we find that local mines,
especially small and private ones, often recruit nonlocal miners based on short-term
contracts to reduce their expenditures on social security and healthcare. Unlike large
SOEs with soft budget constraints, small and private coal enterprises are more sensitive
to the fluctuations of coal prices and demand. By employing miners on an interim
basis, they can lower their operational costs. In addition, coal-mine owners prefer non-
local miners because nonlocals are easier to manage and less likely to engage in labor
disputes. When we asked nonlocal miners the reasons why they worked there, many of
them stated that they were not well educated and only qualified to do low-skilled work.
They are clearly aware of the potential hazards they are facing but are still willing to
work because of the relatively decent salary. Their only alternative is to work as farmers
for less income. Due to China’s household registration system, local governments
usually provide little healthcare and social security services to nonlocal workers. Since
the proportion of nonlocal coal miners in coal-rich areas tends to be higher, the
governments thus spend less on healthcare and social security (Wright 2012; Chen and
Zhang 2016).
Coal-mining activities give rise to environmental deterioration and pollution, for
which governments are expected to take some countermeasures. However, the statis-
tical results show that as the Coal Dependence Index increases, government spending
on environmental protection actually decreases. How can this unexpected result be ex-
plained? In the era of planned economy, coal mines were exclusively owned by large
state-owned and collective-owned enterprises, and the volume of coal mining was usu-
ally low due to the limited demand. As a consequence, at that time, coal production
did not cause severe environmental damage. With the rapid economic growth, reform
of state-owned enterprises, and the opening of market, the demand for coal production
has continuously increased since the mid-1990s. During this period, the number and
production volume of local private mines quickly increased and are often under lax
supervision. Owing to their private property rights, private mines often have fewer cor-
porate social responsibilities than state-owned and collective mines, resulting in a more
environmental damage (Wang and Jin 2007). Since mining in urban areas is strictly
limited, local mines especially the private ones, usually exploit rural and township
areas. Since the environmental damage caused in these areas often bring less public
complaints and it is difficult for upper-level governments to monitor the law-breaking
officials, coal production in these areas is often characterized by more collusion be-
tween the regulators and the regulated enterprises. In other words, in order to max-
imally utilize production capacity and earn as much as possible, coal-mine owners
often seek rents from the regulators at the cost of the environment. The deteriorating
environment has caught the attention of Shanxi’s provincial government. Its official
documents have admitted several times that coal mining in Shanxi Province has caused
severe environmental damage and more efforts should be devoted to protecting the en-
vironment in coal-producing areas (Shanxi’s General Office of Provincial Government
2007; Shanxi’s Development and Reform Commission of Provincial Government 2013).
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Conclusion
What are the transmission channels of the resource-curse hypothesis? Employing a
dataset of Shanxi’s county-level governments and using cross-sectional regressions, we
studied the transmission channels through which natural-resource abundance affects
governmental fiscal behaviors. We found that in coal-abundant areas, the fiscal reve-
nues of local governments rely more on resource rents. Based on the hypotheses pro-
posed by the explanations of political shortsightedness and state centralism, we
explored how rich coal resources affect governments’ provision of public goods. We
found that due to their higher state autonomy and lower responsiveness to social de-
mands, coal-rich county-level governments spend significantly less on social expendi-
tures, as well as the specific expenditures of education, environmental protection, and
social security and healthcare. At the same time, coal-rich governments tend to have a
higher share of administrative expenditures in total expenditures. Through these ana-
lyses, this paper sheds new light on the causal mechanisms of the resource-curse hy-
pothesis in China’s context.
Some measures can be taken to cope with the resource-curse problem. In recent
years, since many small-size coal mines in Shanxi have been shut down or taken over
by large state-owned coal enterprises, the implementation of work-safety regulations
has improved substantially. However, problems like mining accidents, health hazards to
miners, neglect of human capital investment, and environmental deterioration are still
pervasive. To deal with them, coal-abundant areas should better utilize their rich coal
rents and devote more expenditures to human capital accumulation. In the fiscal sys-
tem area, China has started the reform of coal taxes, transforming coal-related fees into
taxes and increasing the central government’s share of coal taxes (Ministry of Finance
and State Administration of Taxation 2014). By doing so, China can ease the detrimen-
tal effect of resource rent on local government behaviors. Further measures should also
be considered, such as better fiscal information disclosure.
Due to the limited availability of research data, this paper only employed a cross-
county dataset from 2007. Future studies could extend the time period and choose
other cases. For other transmission mechanisms, future studies can discuss whether
and to what extent resource rents affect the promotion opportunities of local officials,
the rampancy of corruption, and the Gini coefficient of residents’ income. Since
Shanxi’s local governments will eventually run out of coal resources, future studies
could also address the questions of how the local industrial structure can be trans-
formed, and how local governments can then collect enough revenue.
Endnotes
1There are seven provincial-level state-owned coal enterprises and two central-level
state-owned coal enterprises in Shanxi. See State Administration of Work Safety and
Coal Mine Safety 2014.
2In China, the price of coal is divided into thermal and commercial coal. Guided by
state policy, thermal coal is cheaper than commercial coal. We used the price of
thermal coal in 2007, 230 yuan per ton (230 yuan ≈ 34.40 USD) (Pan 2008). It is conser-
vative to use the price of thermal coal because this does not overestimate the influence
of coal production on local economic development.
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